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A COMMENT ON REDISH AND KALUDIS'S THE
RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE A CCESS 1N FIRST
AMENDMENT THEORY
Nadine Strossen"
Along with Professor Redish, the ACLU and I have been accused of
"free speech fundamentalism." This is an interesting counterbalance to the
other charge we often face-in Robert Bork's recent best-selling book,' for
example-namely, the charge of being unduly liberal or even radical. In
any event, given my "conservative" approach to First Amendment issues, I
am of course very enthusiastic about Redish and Kaludis's paper.2  Con-
cerning claimed access rights, their paper makes the same point that I and
the ACLU have been making in a number of contexts recently, including
debates over censoring "hate speech" 3 and "pornography, ' 4 as well as cam-
paign finance "reform" measures that limit political expression."
The arguments made by access proponents, as well as advocates of
these other types of speech regulations, all share two core premises: first,
that there is a conflict between classic free speech principles and equality
values and, second, that given this conflict, we have to restrict certain ex-
pression-namely, hate speech, pornography, and campaign spending-if
we want to advance the equality of groups such as racial minorities,
women, and non-fat cats.6 Since the ACLU always has been as committed
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union. For assis-
tance with this piece, Professor Strossen gratefully acknowledges her Chief Aide, Amy L. Tenney, and
her Research Assistants, Ili Graeler and JoAnn Squillace.
I ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOwARDs GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 97-98, 152-53 (1996).
2 Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory:
Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1083 (1999).
3 See, eg., HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR. ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH,
CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1994); American Civil Liberties Union, Briefing Paper #16: Hate
Speech On Campus (1996) (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/library/pbpl6.html>.
4 See, eg., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT
FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995); American Civil Liberties Union, Briefing Paper #14: Freedom of Expres-
sion in theArts and Entertainment (1997) (visited Sept 7, 1999) <http/www.aclu.orglibrary/pbpl4.html>.
5 See, eg., Nadine Strossen et al., A Reform that Endangers Free Speech, WASH. POST, July 6,
1998, at Al9.
6 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Burt Neubome, A Survey of Exist-
ing Efforts to Reform the Campaign Finance System (1998) (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School
of Law, New York, N.Y.); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
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to equality rights as to free speech rights, we do not approach any of these
issues by automatically elevating one set of rights over the other. Rather,
in each of these situations we have concluded that the asserted tension is in
fact a false one; in other words, the speech restriction not only would vio-
late fundamental First Amendment principles, but also would fail to ad-
vance the allegedly countervailing equality values. In each of these
situations, the speech restriction would be, at best, ineffective in promoting
equality and, at worst, counterproductive.
These conclusions follow not just from abstract analysis but also, nota-
bly, from actual experience with how the restrictions are enforced. Experi-
ence shows, for example, that hate speech codes designed to advance equal
rights for racial minorities in fact are disproportionately enforced against
expression by and on behalf of those very minorities; 8 that anti-pornography
laws intended to advance equal rights for women in fact are disproportion-
ately enforced against expression by and on behalf of feminists;9 and that
campaign "reform" laws touted as opening up the political process to those
who lack money, clout, and connections have in fact been used to harass
small, issue-oriented, grassroots citizens' groups.'
0
These patterns are not just a matter of coincidence, but rather flow in-
evitably from the very features of our political system that are stressed by
the access proponents and other would-be reformers themselves. As they
point out, our government and other major societal institutions reflect cer-
tain pervasive hierarchies and biases-including those established on the
basis of race, sex, and class. From this analysis of the problem, though, it
hardly follows that an effective solution would involve giving more power
to government agencies. To the contrary. Yet, all of these touted "reform"
strategies-including access rights-do precisely that. Indeed, they give
government the particularly dangerous power to pick and choose from
among ideas and speakers those that should be either punished or preferred.
Redish and Kaludis make an important new contribution to this general
debate. They not only highlight the dire free speech dangers of access
rights, they also show that the asserted countervailing benefits are, at best,
purely speculative. I will amplify on these two overarching insights of the
paper, which are captured by two old sayings. First, if it ain't broke, don't
7 See Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil Liberties Un-
ion Past, Present, and Future, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143 (1994).
8 See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in GATES ET AL., supra note 3,
at 225-27.
9 See STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 224-46.
10 See Steven Hayward & Allison R. Hayward, Gagging on Political Reform, 28 REASON 20 (1996) (not-
ing that the FEC "functions more and more as a censor of political expression, especially by issue-oriented,
grassroots activists" and that the FEC has focused on "grassroots groups and citizens [which are] far less well-
funded"); see also American Civil Liberties Union Campaign Finance Reform Fact Sheet #3: Why Should Mi-
norities, Women, Low Income or Non-Mainstream Groups be Highly Skeptical of Current Campaign Finance
Proposals? (1998) (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/congresslcfi06l298a.html>.
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fix it. Second, the cure is worse than the disease."1 The first adage is apt
because of the exaggerated sense of crisis that impels calls for access rights.
As Redish and Kaludis note, though, since access-right advocates initially
warned of growing media concentration, intervening technological devel-
opments have allayed these concerns. Notable are the phenomenal growth
of cable and cybermedia, which their paper describes in general terms.
Just as Redish and Kaludis have provided the first detailed study of the
actual free speech dangers of access rights--concluding that those dangers
are great-two other authors recently have completed the most detailed
study of the actual free speech dangers of media concentration-and they
have concluded that those dangers are not great.12 Their article is entitled
The Media Monopoly and Other Myths, and the authors are economist Eli
M. Noam, Director of Columbia University's Institute for Tele-Information,
and attorney Robert N. Freeman, Administrator of Rights and Clearances
for NBC News. As some of you know, Eli Noam happens to be my hus-
band. But I assure you that I have other reasons for finding what he says
highly persuasive; after all, the Economist recently described him as a "tele-
communications guru.' ' 3
Eli and his co-author dispel widespread but unsubstantiated assump-
tions about increasing media concentration by looking at actual facts and
figures. In their words:
When it comes to concentration, views are strong, talk is cheap, but numbers
are scarce. Therefore, we have gotten our hands dirty by collecting the actual
market share numbers, industry by industry, company by company, for 60 sub-
industries from book publishing to film production to microprocessors ... to
trace the concentration trends over the past 15 years.14
The result was "probably the most detailed study ever done of media con-
centration in America. Its conclusion? In their words: "Surprisingly,
the overall concentration of the information industry did not increase, but
[to the contrary] declined somewhat in the past decade.'
16
11 A third old adage is also relevant: An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. If the newly
emerging media are to fulfill their promise and potential, they cannot be shackled by any form of cen-
sorship-neither traditional governmental censorship, nor what Owen Fiss calls "managerial" censor-
ship. See Owen Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1215 (1999).
12 See Eli M. Noam & Robert N. Freeman, The Media Monopoly and Other Myths, 29 TELEVISION
Q., 1997, at 18.
13 A Connected World, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1997, at S3.
14 Noam & Freeman, supra note 12, at 19. In a conversation shortly before this piece went to press,
Eli Noam noted that, since the study was concluded in 1997, several mergers have raised concentration
levels somewhat, but aggregate concentration is still lower than it was in 1984, the study's benchmark
year. Interview with Eli M. Noam, Director, Columbia University Institute for Tele-Information, in
New York, N.Y. (Apr. 4, 1999).
Is Noam & Freeman, supra note 12, at 19.
16 Id. at 20.
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In fairness, this study did find some media concentration problems, but
they were mostly at the local level-for example, 98.5% of American cities
have only one newspaper. 17 But access advocates are certainly not focusing
their reformist efforts on local newspapers. And, on the important national
level, the Noam and Freeman study stresses that the access opportunities
and trends are positive. It concluded: "On the national level.... there will
be more competition, more conduits, more content. With the number of
channels increasing, smaller firms can enter."' 8 In short, in terms of access,
the system just "ain't broke," so we shouldn't even try to "fix it." Moreo-
ver, the so-called "fix" of access rights is really no such thing. In other
words, the cure is worse than the disease. Indeed, Redish and Kaludis's pa-
per itself expressly invokes this very phrase.' 9
Again, I would like to stress the insights I have gained from the
ACLU's actual experience in confronting government bureaucrats who en-
force speech restrictions, including access rules. I may not trust media mo-
guls or other fat-cats who wield economic power or political influence, but
if it is a choice between them or the government, I think they are definitely
the lesser of the two evils. That great libertarian and egalitarian, Justice
William 0. Douglas, forcefully expressed the same view in an opinion criti-
cizing the Fairness Doctrine, an access right that the Supreme Court had
upheld over his protest and that was designed to promote the broadcast of
diverse views about controversial public issues. Douglas explicitly ac-
knowledged that the media are far from perfect in terms of presenting di-
verse views.20  However, he immediately warned that "the prospect of
putting Government in a position of control over publishers is to me an ap-
palling one, even to the extent of the Fairness Doctrine. The struggle for
liberty has been a struggle against Government.",
2'
I will illustrate this lesser-of-two-evils or the-cure-is-worse-than-the-
disease point through two examples: the "Fairness Doctrine" that Justice
Douglas assailed, and election "reform" laws. In both cases, laws that were
intended to equalize access and to enrich and diversify public discourse
have too often had the opposite effect. They have caused intrusive govern-
ment surveillance and regulation of expression with outright harassment of
certain speakers and an enormous chilling effect on countless others.
In 1985, the FCC itself concluded that, in operation, the Fairness Doc-
trine did exactly the opposite of what it was supposed to: it decreased the
diversity of broadcast views in general and deterred non-mainstream or
anti-establishment views in particular.22 Echoing other studies, the FCC's
17 See id. at 22 ("They rarely editorialize about that.").
18 Id.
19 Redish & Kaludis, supra note 2, at 1118.
20 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 161 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 162.
22 General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35418 (1985).
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report specifically concluded that the Fairness Doctrine had the following
four adverse effects. First, it "lessens the amount of diverse views available
to the ublic.' '23 Second, it "inhibit[s] the expression of unorthodox opin-
ions. ''24 Third, it puts government in the "intrusive role.., of scrutinizing
program content."' And finally, it "creates the opportunity for intimidation
of broadcasters by governmental officials."
26
Another strong champion of both free speech and equality values who
strongly criticized the Fairness Doctrine, both in theory and in operation,
was David Bazelon, the former Chief Judge of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In one case, for example, Judge Bazelon dis-
sented from his court's decision upholding the FCC's refusal to renew the
license of radio station WXUR in Philadelphia. The FCC denied the license
renewal on Fairness Doctrine grounds. But Judge Bazelon explained that,
perversely, the doctrine's purposes were in fact disserved by this decision.
As he stated:
[WXUR was] a radio station devoted to speaking out and stirring debate on
controversial issues. The station... propagate[d] a viewpoint that was not
being heard in the greater Philadelphia area .... [T]hrough its interview and
call-in shows it did offer a variety of opinions on a broad range of public is-
sues, and ... it never refused to lend its broadcast facilities to spokesmen of
conflicting viewpoints .... It is beyond dispute that [as a result of the FCC's
decision,] the public has lost access to information and ideas.
27
Even worse than using the Fairness Doctrine to shut down or chill the ex-
pression of broadcast outlets such as WXUR, which present a range of per-
spectives, government officials have used the doctrine selectively to silence
particular disfavored perspectives. For example, during the Nixon Admini-
stration, Fairness Doctrine complaints were made or threatened specifically
to reduce broadcast coverage of anti-Vietnam War protests.28 In sum, gov-
ernment officials have enforced the Fairness Doctrine in ways that, pre-
dictably, undermine both free speech and access. And the same is true
concerning campaign finance laws that also aim to increase access to chan-
nels of expression and influence.
2 Id, at 35423.
24 id. at 35433.
25 Id. at 35434.
26 Id,
27 Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
28 See General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, supra note 22, at 35434; see
also Hugh C. Donahue, The Fairness Doctrine is Shackling Broadcast, 89 TECH. REV. 44, 48 (Nov.
1986) ("On 21 occasions at the height of anti-war demonstrations in October 1969, President Nixon or-
dered his staff to take 'specific action relating to what could be considered unfair news coverage.'
Nixon cowed the networks so successfully that they did not interrupt coverage of weekend football to
show massive anti-war demonstrations in the nation's capital.").
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The ACLU's longstanding opposition to so-called "reform" efforts in
this context, as in the others I have mentioned, does not reflect some knee-
jerk exaltation of free speech above equality rights. Rather, our position re-
flects the lesson that, in operation, these "reforms" are as inimical to the
important goal of equalizing political participation as they are to core free
speech concerns. That is so because these laws can be-and, predictably,
have been-used to stifle precisely the kind of citizen activism that they are
supposed to encourage.
The ACLU's first case in this area was all too typical. Back in 1972,
we represented three elderly middle-class citizens with no connection to any
candidate or political party. They published an advertisement in the New
York Times that condemned the U.S.'s secret bombings of Cambodia, called
for the impeachment of Richard Nixon, and printed an honor roll of those
members of Congress who had opposed the bombings. The honor roll in-
cluded Senator George McGovern, who was then a potential rival to Rich-
ard Nixon in the upcoming presidential election.29
This ad was a classic example of the type of political speech that the
Supreme Court has placed at the top of the First Amendment hierarchy.
However, it violated a federal campaign finance reform law, because it
could influence the impending presidential election. Invoking this law, the
U.S. Government sued our three clients, seeking to bar them from publish-
ing such ads. The government also wrote a letter to the Times threatening it
with criminal prosecution if it published another such ad.30 Soon after, the
ACLU itself tried to purchase space in the Times to publish an open letter to
President Nixon, criticizing his position on school desegregation. Consis-
tent with the ACLU's strictly non-partisan stance, our letter did not even
mention the election. Yet, the Times had been duly intimidated by the gov-
ernment's threatening letter from the previous case, and therefore refused to
publish the ad.3'
The ACLU ultimately won both cases.32 But the fact remains that it
took court battles to vindicate the right to engage in precisely the types of
speech, by precisely the types of speakers, that are championed by access
advocates in general and campaign finance reformers in particular. Worse
29 See Testimony of Ira Glasser Executive Dir, ACLU, bejore the United Staes House of Representatives Sub-
conun. on the Constitution (Feb. 27,1997) (visited Sept. 7,1999) <http//wwwalu.orgcongresst022797.hunl>.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See United States v. Nat'l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that
an advertisement published by the National Committee for Impeachment did not render the Committee
"political" under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and therefore did not subject the Commit-
tee to the requirements of the Act); ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (enjoining en-
forcement of the regulatory procedure adopted under Title I of FECA to enforce spending limitations in
the communications media imposed upon candidates for federal office because they imposed impermis-
sible prior restraints, and restricting the scope of "political committees" under Title III of FECA, thereby
removing plaintiffs from its purview), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
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yet, in looking-glass fashion, government officials were suppressing this
speech under laws that were touted as equalizing access.
Unfortunately, this pattern has persisted to this day under more recent
campaign finance laws. In operation, these laws continue to undermine ac-
cess, as well as free speech. In the name of campaign finance "reform," the
Federal Election Commission ("FEC") has sweepingly suppressed the po-
litical speech of citizen activists across the board-from the National Or-
ganization for Women33 to the National Right to Life Committee.34
Let me cite another all-too-typical case, decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1980. The ACLU represented a local tax
reform group from central Long Island. The court agreed with us that the
FEC was completely out of line with its heavy-handed efforts to enforce re-
porting and other burdensome, intrusive requirements against these small-
scale activists. Irving Kaufman, the Second Circuit's Chief Judge at the
time, was so outraged that he wrote a separate, blistering concurrence. That
opinion was joined by another of the court's most respected, and progres-
sive, jurists, Judge James Oakes. Here are some excerpts:
The defendants in this case undertook to spend the modest sum of $135
for the purpose of preparing and circulating to their fellow citizens a pamphlet
addressed to the issue of tax reform ....
I confess that I find this episode somewhat perverse. It is disturbing be-
cause citizens of this nation should not be required to account to this court for
engaging in debate of political issues ....
.... I continue to believe that campaign "reform" legislation of the sort
before us is of doubtful constitutionality....
If speakers are not granted wide latitude to disseminate information with-
out government interference, they will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone,"
thereby depriving citizens of valuable opinions and information. This danger
is especially acute when an official agency of government has been created to
scrutinize the content of political expression, for such bureaucracies feed upon
speech and almost ineluctably come to view unrestrained expression as a po-
tential "evil" to be tamed, muzzled or sterilized. Accordingly, it is not com-
pletely surprising that the FEC should view the content of defendants' leaflet
in a substantially different light than the members of this court.
The possible inevitability of this institutional tendency, however, renders
this abuse of power no less disturbing to those who cherish the First Amend-
ment and the unfettered political process it guarantees. Buckley v. Valeo im-
posed upon the FEC the weighty, if not impossible, obligation to exercise its
powers in a manner harmonious with a system of free expression. Our deci-
33 Karen Alexander, Republican-Backed Measure Would Impose Term Limits on Elections Agency's
Controversial General Counsel, LEGAL TIMEs, June 22, 1998, at 2.
34 See id.
35 See Federal Election Comm'n. v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d
45,54-55 (2d Cir. 1980).
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sion today should stand as an admonition to the Commission that... it has
failed abysmally to meet this awesome responsibility.
36
Unfortunately, since this rebuke in 1980, the FEC's record continues to
warrant the same kind of criticism. As a 1996 article concluded, the FEC
has focused its attention on "grassroots groups and citizens who want to
take part in the political debate, too--groups far less well-funded and less
capable of extricating themselves from the tangle of FEC regulations. ' "
Thus, the FEC has functioned "more and more as a censor of political ex-
pression, especially by issue-oriented, grassroots activists."3
We already have a time-tested engine of access for ideas and influence.
Steadily, throughout our history, it has increased the range of participants
and perspectives within our political system. And while it has not yet
brought us perfect equality or access, it does promise to keep bringing us
closer to those important goals. Certainly, its track record is far more im-
pressive than that of purported reformist improvements. I am talking, of
course, about the First Amendment.
36 Id. at 54 (Kaufman, C.J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
37 See Hayward & Hayward, supra note 10, at 20.
38 Id.
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